Difference between revisions of "Georgios Vlachos"

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Vlachos was born in [[1886]], studied law and worked in the Justice Department, the [[National Bank of Greece]], etc. He also wrote freelance for several [[Athens]] dailies. In [[1917]], during the great national divide between Royalists and [[Venizelism|Venizelists]], he was exiled to the island of [[Skyros]] and later to [[Skopelos]].
 
Vlachos was born in [[1886]], studied law and worked in the Justice Department, the [[National Bank of Greece]], etc. He also wrote freelance for several [[Athens]] dailies. In [[1917]], during the great national divide between Royalists and [[Venizelism|Venizelists]], he was exiled to the island of [[Skyros]] and later to [[Skopelos]].
  
On his return from exile, in [[1919]], he became the publisher of daily "Kathimerini".  His article "Οίκαδε!" ("Homeward!") urged a withdrawal of the Greek army from [[Asia Minor]] where they had landed after the [[World War I|First World War]] and the article's title became the rallying cry of the [[Laiko Party|Popular Party]].   
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On his return from exile, in [[1919]], he became the publisher of daily "[[Kathimerini]]".  His article "Οίκαδε!" ("Homeward!") urged a withdrawal of the Greek army from [[Asia Minor]] where they had landed after the [[World War I|First World War]] and the article's title became the rallying cry of the [[Laiko Party|Popular Party]].   
  
 
After the [[Asia Minor Disaster]] and until his death, Vlachos continued as publisher of "Kathimerini". His article "Open letter to Hitler", written when German invasion of Greece was imminent in [[World War II]], went down in history as a masterpiece of Greek journalism.  
 
After the [[Asia Minor Disaster]] and until his death, Vlachos continued as publisher of "Kathimerini". His article "Open letter to Hitler", written when German invasion of Greece was imminent in [[World War II]], went down in history as a masterpiece of Greek journalism.  
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Vlachos died on [[October 10]], [[1951]]. His daughter, [[Eleni Vlachou]] of anti-[[Junta]] fame, succeeded him as publisher of "Kathimerini".
 
Vlachos died on [[October 10]], [[1951]]. His daughter, [[Eleni Vlachou]] of anti-[[Junta]] fame, succeeded him as publisher of "Kathimerini".
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[[Category:1886 births|Vlachos, Georgios]]
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[[Category:1951 deaths|Vlachos, Georgios]]
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[[Category:Newspaper Publishers|Vlachos, Georgios]]
  
 
==An Open Letter to Hitler==
 
==An Open Letter to Hitler==
''(The following was printed in "Kathimerini" on [[March 8]], [[1941]].
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''(The following was printed in "Kathimerini" on [[March 8]], [[1941]]. This translation is from the newspaper's internet site: [http://www.ekathimerini.com]''
This translation of the open letter is Appendix II of the book "Greece Against the Axis" by Stanley Casson, first published in London in 1941 by Hamish Hamilton and reprinted 3 times in 1942.)''
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To His Excellency, Adolf Hitler,  
 
To His Excellency, Adolf Hitler,  
 
Chancellor of the German Reich
 
Chancellor of the German Reich
  
Excellency,  
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Excellency,
Greece, as you know, wished to keep out of the present war. When it broke out she had barely recovered frim the wounds that she had suffered from various wars and dissensions at home. She had neither the strength nor the intention, nor any reason to take part in a war, the end of which, no doubt, would be of great importance to the whole world, but at the start did not offer any direct threat to her integrity. Let us ignore her declarations on this point, let us ignore the official documents published in the White Book, let us ignore the speeches and articles which bore witness to her permanent desire to keep out of the war. Let us take into account one fact only. When, after the Italian sinking of the Helle in the port if Tenos, Greece found the remains of torpedoes, when she had proof that these torpedoes were Italian, she kept silent. Why? Because if she had disclosed the truth she would have been forced either to declare war, or to see war declared against her. Greece never wished for war with Italy, neither by herself nor with allies, whether these be British or Balkan. She wished only for her small part of the world to live as quietly as possible, because she was exhausted, because she had fought many wars and because her geographical position is such that she could not have as an enemy either the Germans on land or the English on sea.  
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As you are aware, Greece wanted to stay out of the current war. When it broke out, Greece was just recovering from a series of great wounds caused by wars abroad and domestic division; it had neither the strength nor the desire nor any reason to get involved in a war whose outcome will certainly have serious consequences for the whole world but whose onset did not present direct dangers to Greece.
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Even if one does not take into account Greece’s direct statements, nor the documents that it published, nor the many speeches and documents certifying its intention to stay out of the war, one should pay heed to the following: That when the Greeks found the fragments of the torpedo that sank the light cruiser Elli in the port of Tinos (on August 15, 1940) and they confirmed that it was Italian, they hid the fact.
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Why? Because if they had revealed this they would have been obliged to declare war or to accept the declaration of war. Greece did not want war with the Italians, neither on its own nor as part of an alliance, nor with other Balkan countries nor with the English. All it wanted was to live peacefully in this small corner of the world, because it was exhausted, because it had fought much and because its geographical position is such that it does not wish to have as its enemy the Germans on land nor the English at sea. Until that moment, the moment that the Elli was sunk, in addition to its pacifist inclinations, Greece also had the additional security of two signatures: An Italian non-aggression agreement and an English one guaranteeing Greece’s territorial integrity.
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And so, shortly after the attack on the Elli, which provided tangible proof of future Italian aggression, convinced that the one signature was worthless, Greece still did not turn to the other side, as it ought to have done. Instead, it turned to you, Excellency. Do you recall? And it requested your protection. And what reply did Greece receive? I am not well-informed as to the reply. I know, however, according to our now-deceased prime minister, that Germany replied that we should not provide a pretext — that we should not mobilize, in other words — and for us to remain quiet. So we did not provide cause, we did not mobilize, we remained quiet. Or rather, we should say we slept quietly because a day earlier the Italians had hosted a dinner for us, when the Italian ambassador presented the ultimatum.
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And so, to whom would you expect Greece to turn? To the Italians, in the knowledge of where the torpedo came from, and the worthless signature? But they had declared war on Greece. Toward you? But you, unfortunately, were in Florence that very morning, on October 28. Should Greece stand alone? But it had neither an air force nor materiel nor money nor a fleet. So it turned toward the only other power whose signature it held. The English. And they, even though their homeland was burning, who were on wary guard on the Channel’s shores, who did not have enough means for their own security, heeded our call. They came immediately. Without demands, without negotiations, without documents. And after a few days, on the front that the brutal Italian surprise attack had established in the mountains of Epirus, the first Greek soldiers and the first English airman fell.
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You and the whole world know what happened after those hours. The Italians were defeated. And they were defeated in man-to-man fighting by us — the small, the weak. Not by the English. Because no English soldier set foot in Albania. The Italians were defeated. Why? Because they had no ideals, because they did not have the heart for this. Because... — But that is not our issue here.
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You remained a spectator of this battle, and we were told that you said: “This issue does not concern me. It is an Italian problem. I will not intervene unless English soldiers disembark in Thessaloniki in large numbers.” Since then, Excellency, we could ask you: “What about Florence? When, on the day that the Italians attacked Greece, you met with them on the banks of the Arno and handed over Greece?” But we did not wish to pose the question. Along with the fragments of the Italian torpedo we also hid in our pocket the meeting in Florence. And when some indiscreet voices would remind us of this we would reply: “The Germans disagreed. The Italians tricked them.” Why?
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Because we wanted to believe this. Because it was in our interest. Later, as we advanced into Albania, so did relations between Germany and Greece improve. The swastika flew above your Embassy in Athens at the start of the new year. It was lowered to half-staff when Prime Minister (Ioannis) Metaxas died. Your ambassador visited to congratulate the new prime minister. Trade relations between our two countries had resumed. And you protested vigorously when an American newspaper reported that German tanks had appeared in Albania. So all was well. We were in Albania, you were spectators and our English allies took part only with their aircraft and their fleet.
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Only. You know how hard we tried to keep their participation at that. We need only recall that when a British airplane crashed in Thessaloniki we requested of the British that they not be the ones to recover it. So that not even 10 English soldiers be seen there. So that we do not provide a pretext. You laugh?... You should.
  
At the moment of the sinking of the Helle, Greece, apart from her pacific longings, had a guarantee as well, bearing two signatures. The Italian signature, which had guaranteed her against all aggression on the part of Italy, and that of England, which was a spontaneous guarantee of Greek integrity. Nevertheless, when, some time after the sinking of the Helle, Italy had shown clearer signs of her future aggression, Greece, convinced that the first signature was valueless, did not turn, as she should have turned, towards the country which had given her the second. She turned - do you remember, Excellency? - towards yourself, and she asked for your protecion. What was the reply we were given then? What was said I do not know exactly, but this I know, because I heard it from the lips of our late President himself, that Germany replied to our request by advising us not to offer any pretexts - that is to say, not to mobilise - and to stay quiet.  
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But at this time, even though we had relations, even though Germany’s position created a sense of some calm, you started to assemble forces in Romania. At first they were intended to train Romanians. Then they were to protect the oil there. Then they were to protect that country’s borders. Then — then they were 400,000. At that time, the undersigned visited Bulgaria on a journalistic mission and passed along the route that your troops are now passing. On his return, he told our late prime minister: “The road to Sofia has been widened. The wooden bridges have been recently fortified with supports. The shavings from the timber are still there. It is clear that the Bulgarians have worked hastily to prepare the road for an army to pass upon it...
  
We did not offer any pretexts,we did not mobilise; we slept quietly, or rather we were sleeping quietly - for that evening the Italians had invited us to dinner - when the Italian Minister appeared with his ultimatum. To whom and where then would you have liked us to turn? Towards Italy, whose valueless signature we had in our pocket with the remains of the torpedoes? But it was the Italians who had declared the war. Towards yourself? But unfortunately that very morning of October 28th, you were in Florence. To remain alone? We had no air force, no material, no money and no fleet. We turned then to the signature left, to the English. And those whose own homeland was in flames, those were keeping anxious watch and ward on the Channel, those who, they said it themselves, had not sufficient material for their own defence, they came, and they came immediately. Without haggling, without excuses, they came, and a few days later on the front in the mountains of Epirus, where the brutal Italian aggression had begun, fell together the Greek troops and the first English airman.
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After this, what was Greece to do? To request assistance? Not to request assistance? To show trust? Not to show trust? Could Greece remain unmoved when it saw the Germans on the Bulgarian border, when it counted them crossing the Danube, when it saw them entering Sofia and forging an alliance with the Bulgarians, when it heard the Bulgarians talk about the national goals that they wanted to achieve? Could Greece believe that the Germans were in Koula (on the Greek-Bulgarian border) in order to protect Romanian oil?
  
What happened after that you know well, you and the whole world. The Italians have been thrashed. They have been thrashed there man to man by us, the weak and Feeble Greeks. Not by the English, because no English soldier has set foot in Albania. The Italians have been thrashed. Why? Because they had no ideals, because they had no heart in the fight, because - but this is another story. In the face of this victory, it is sure because we have been told so, you have remained a spectator. "This affair," you said, "does not interest me. It concerns the Italians only. I will only interfere when the English army lands at Salonika in numbers." We could have asked your Excellency: "Florence? Is it a fact that on the very day that the Italians attacked us you were meeting them on the banks of the Arno, and you handed over to them the Greeks?" But we did not wish to ask. Hidden away with the remains of the Italian torpedoes we hid Florence also, and when indiscreet people brought it to our notice we said, "They were not in agreement, the Italians deceived them." Why?
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But even so, let us leave all these incidents and declarations and history aside and let us come to the present. It appears, according to all the world’s radio stations, that the Germans want to invade Greece. And we ask you: Why? If the operation against Greece were deemed necessary for the Axis from the start, then (Italian ambassador Count Emmanuele) Grazzi would not have appeared on his own (to Metaxas) four months ago at 3 o’clock in the morning. Italy and Germany together would have presented another ultimatum, with different contents, with different deadlines.
  
Because thatis what we wished to believe. That is what it was our interest to believe. So at the same time as we were advancing in Albania, our relations with Germany went smoothly on their way. The swastika flew from your Legation on New Year's day, it came to half-mast when Metaxas dies, and your Minister paidhis respects to the new President of the Council. Commercial dealings were renewed, and you yourselves protested strongly on one occasion when an American paper announced that German tanks had appeared in Albania. You as spectators, and the English, our allies, with their air force and their fleet. Only that. You know how we tried to keep that "Only that" a reality. Enough to say that when an English aeroplane crashed at Salonika we asked the English not to salvage it themselves, in order that not even ten British soldiers should appear there, in order that there should be no misunderstanding, no pretexts. You laugh? How right you are.  
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So, the operation against Greece was not deemed necessary for the Axis at the start. But is it now? Why? So that there may not be a new front against Germany in the Balkans? But that is nonsense.
  
But all the time that our relations were like this, while a certain calm due to the German attitude remained, you had begun to concentrate forces in Rumania. But the first contingent were to teach the Rumanian army, the second to protect the oilfields, the third the frontiers. The fourth... but the fourth contingent was 300,000 men. The writer went as a journalist to Bulgaria, covering the road over which now pass your soldiers. And when he came back he said to the late President, "The road to Sofia has just been widened. The wooden bridges have just been strengthened, the shavings of the carpenters are still lying on the ground. It is clear that the Bulgarians have got ready hastily the road on which an army passes."
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Neither Greece, which is at war, nor England (it clearly says as much in the official statement of two days ago, on March 6, but common sense argues for this even more strongly), nor Serbia, nor Turkey have any reason to provoke the further spread of the war. The war as it is is enough for them. In which case, why? Is it so that the Italians can be rescued in Albania? But what kind of rescue will this be? Will the Italians not be seen by the whole world to have been defeated totally, finally and for all time the moment the first German soldier sets foot in Greece? Will the whole world not cry out that all 45 million of them attacked our small nation of 8 million and they now call on the help of another 85 million to save them?
  
And after that what was Greece to do? To see the Germans on the frontiers of Bulgaria? To count their ships on the Danube, to see them entering Sofia and allying themselves with the Bulgarians? To hear the Bulgarians talking of their national claims, and to keep calm in the knowledge tha the Germans are at Koula to guard the Rumanian oilfields?
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And in the end, they may want to be rescued, but why should others come to their rescue in a way that is so demeaning? When we can help rescue them without making fools of them? Let the Italians leave Albania of their own accord... Let them tell everyone that they beat us, that they got tired of chasing us around, that they have had their fill of glory and are now leaving. We will help them.
  
But enough. Forget the past. Come to facts. According to every witness station in the world it appears that the Germans wished to invade Greece. Why? If an attack on Greece was from the beginning essential to the interests of the Axis, M. Grazzi would not have been laone four months ago at three o'clock in the morning. Germany and Italy would have been together. Fron the beginning, therefore, the attack on Greece does not seem to have been necessary for the Axis. Apparently now it is. But why? Is it an order that a front was not to be created in the Balkans against Germany? But this comes out of a fairy story. Neither the Greeks nor the English - this was stated officially in a communique of March 6th, and is shouted from the housetops by logic - nor Serbia nor Turkey have any reason for spreading the war. The war as it has been is big enough for all these countries. Is it, then, in order to save the Italians in Albania? But what sort of salvation is this? The Italians have been thrashed openly and for all eternity, and will not the public opinion of the world be certain of this thrashing as soon as a single German soldier steps on to the soil of Greece? Will not the whole world shout that forty-five millions of Italians after having attacked our poor eight millions, have now to call for help to another eighty-five millions? But if the Italians wish to be saved, why should others come to their help in a way which is particularly humiliating for them when we could save them ourselves with pleasure and without exposing them to ridicule? Let the Italians evacuate Albania, let them shout from the housetops that they are tired of chasing us and are satiated with glory and have decided to retire. We will help them. But, Excellency, perhaps you are going to say to us, "This is all very well, but what about the English?"
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But you may ask, Excellency, “All this is well and good, but what about the English?” However, Excellency, we did not bring the English to Greece, the Italians did. Can we now tell those whom the Italians brought to go? And let us say that we tell them to leave. Who do we address this to? To the living. But how do we ask for the removal of those who have died? Those who fell in our mountains, those who — wounded — landed their planes in Attica and left their last breath here, those who, though their own country was in flames, came and fought here and fell here and found their grave here?
  
But it is not we, your Excellency, who made the English come to Greece. It was the Italians. And now you wish us to say farewell to those whom the Italians brought here. So be it. Let us say it. But to whom? To the living. But how can we throw out the dead? Those who died on our mountains. Those who, wounded, fell to earth in Attica and drew there their last breath. Those who at a time when their own country was in flames came to Greece and fought there, died there, and there found their graves. Listen, your Excellency, there are deeds which cannot be done in Greece, and that is one of them. We cannot throw out either the living or the dead. We will throw out no one, but we shall stand here upright by their side until the day when the sunshine breaks through the storm.  
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Listen, Excellency, there are shameful deeds that are not committed in Greece. And that would be a most shameful deed. We can chase out neither the living nor the dead. We will not chase out anyone. We will stand with them, here, until there is a ray of sunshine and the storm is over.
  
Everyone is saying that you intend to invade Greece. But we do not believe it, and we are an ingenuous people. We do not believe it of your army, with its history and its traditions which even its enemies do not deny. We do not believe that your army is willing to disgrace itself by such an action. We do not believe that a great power armed to the teeth, with a population of eighty-five millions fighting to create in the world a "New Order," an Order which we thought to be founded on right, we do not believe that this great power wishes to attack on the flank a little country which already struggles for its liberty against an Empire of fourty-five millions.  
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And you? You — they always say — will try to invade Greece. And we? We are a naive nation still and we do not believe this. We do not believe that an army with a long history and tradition — which even its enemies do not deny — will want to soil itself with a horribly wretched act. We do not believe that a heavily armed State of 85 million people fighting to create “a new world order” will ask for an attack on a small Nation that is fighting for its freedom against an Empire of 45 million. Because, what will this army do, Excellency, if instead of infantry, artillery and divisions Greece sends to its borders 20,000 wounded — without legs, without arms, in their bloodied bandages — to meet it? Is there an army anywhere that could attack such border guards?
  
What would your army do, your Excellency, if instead of horse and artillery we sent to receive them on the frontier our twenty thousand wounded in their bloody bandages? But no, that cannot be. Small or great, that part of the Greek army which can be sent there will stand in Thrace as they have stood in Epirus. There they will await the return from Berlin of the Runner, who came five years ago to light the torch at Olympus. We shall see this torch light a fire, a fire which will light this nation, which has taught all other nations how to live, and will now teach them how to die.
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But no, this will not happen. If called upon, the army of Greece, whatever it is that remains free, will stand in Thrace they way it stood in Epirus. It will fight in Thrace as it did in Epirus. It will fight hard. It will die. And it will await the return from Berlin of the runner who came here five years ago and took with him the flame from Olympia, only to return with a torch to light a fire that threatens this land which may be small but is also great. This land that taught the world to live will now teach it how to die.

Latest revision as of 15:08, October 18, 2007

Georgios Angelou Vlachos was a Greek news reporter and publisher.

Vlachos was born in 1886, studied law and worked in the Justice Department, the National Bank of Greece, etc. He also wrote freelance for several Athens dailies. In 1917, during the great national divide between Royalists and Venizelists, he was exiled to the island of Skyros and later to Skopelos.

On his return from exile, in 1919, he became the publisher of daily "Kathimerini". His article "Οίκαδε!" ("Homeward!") urged a withdrawal of the Greek army from Asia Minor where they had landed after the First World War and the article's title became the rallying cry of the Popular Party.

After the Asia Minor Disaster and until his death, Vlachos continued as publisher of "Kathimerini". His article "Open letter to Hitler", written when German invasion of Greece was imminent in World War II, went down in history as a masterpiece of Greek journalism. (See below)

Vlachos died on October 10, 1951. His daughter, Eleni Vlachou of anti-Junta fame, succeeded him as publisher of "Kathimerini".

An Open Letter to Hitler

(The following was printed in "Kathimerini" on March 8, 1941. This translation is from the newspaper's internet site: [1]



To His Excellency, Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of the German Reich

Excellency,

As you are aware, Greece wanted to stay out of the current war. When it broke out, Greece was just recovering from a series of great wounds caused by wars abroad and domestic division; it had neither the strength nor the desire nor any reason to get involved in a war whose outcome will certainly have serious consequences for the whole world but whose onset did not present direct dangers to Greece.

Even if one does not take into account Greece’s direct statements, nor the documents that it published, nor the many speeches and documents certifying its intention to stay out of the war, one should pay heed to the following: That when the Greeks found the fragments of the torpedo that sank the light cruiser Elli in the port of Tinos (on August 15, 1940) and they confirmed that it was Italian, they hid the fact.

Why? Because if they had revealed this they would have been obliged to declare war or to accept the declaration of war. Greece did not want war with the Italians, neither on its own nor as part of an alliance, nor with other Balkan countries nor with the English. All it wanted was to live peacefully in this small corner of the world, because it was exhausted, because it had fought much and because its geographical position is such that it does not wish to have as its enemy the Germans on land nor the English at sea. Until that moment, the moment that the Elli was sunk, in addition to its pacifist inclinations, Greece also had the additional security of two signatures: An Italian non-aggression agreement and an English one guaranteeing Greece’s territorial integrity.

And so, shortly after the attack on the Elli, which provided tangible proof of future Italian aggression, convinced that the one signature was worthless, Greece still did not turn to the other side, as it ought to have done. Instead, it turned to you, Excellency. Do you recall? And it requested your protection. And what reply did Greece receive? I am not well-informed as to the reply. I know, however, according to our now-deceased prime minister, that Germany replied that we should not provide a pretext — that we should not mobilize, in other words — and for us to remain quiet. So we did not provide cause, we did not mobilize, we remained quiet. Or rather, we should say we slept quietly because a day earlier the Italians had hosted a dinner for us, when the Italian ambassador presented the ultimatum.

And so, to whom would you expect Greece to turn? To the Italians, in the knowledge of where the torpedo came from, and the worthless signature? But they had declared war on Greece. Toward you? But you, unfortunately, were in Florence that very morning, on October 28. Should Greece stand alone? But it had neither an air force nor materiel nor money nor a fleet. So it turned toward the only other power whose signature it held. The English. And they, even though their homeland was burning, who were on wary guard on the Channel’s shores, who did not have enough means for their own security, heeded our call. They came immediately. Without demands, without negotiations, without documents. And after a few days, on the front that the brutal Italian surprise attack had established in the mountains of Epirus, the first Greek soldiers and the first English airman fell.

You and the whole world know what happened after those hours. The Italians were defeated. And they were defeated in man-to-man fighting by us — the small, the weak. Not by the English. Because no English soldier set foot in Albania. The Italians were defeated. Why? Because they had no ideals, because they did not have the heart for this. Because... — But that is not our issue here.

You remained a spectator of this battle, and we were told that you said: “This issue does not concern me. It is an Italian problem. I will not intervene unless English soldiers disembark in Thessaloniki in large numbers.” Since then, Excellency, we could ask you: “What about Florence? When, on the day that the Italians attacked Greece, you met with them on the banks of the Arno and handed over Greece?” But we did not wish to pose the question. Along with the fragments of the Italian torpedo we also hid in our pocket the meeting in Florence. And when some indiscreet voices would remind us of this we would reply: “The Germans disagreed. The Italians tricked them.” Why?

Because we wanted to believe this. Because it was in our interest. Later, as we advanced into Albania, so did relations between Germany and Greece improve. The swastika flew above your Embassy in Athens at the start of the new year. It was lowered to half-staff when Prime Minister (Ioannis) Metaxas died. Your ambassador visited to congratulate the new prime minister. Trade relations between our two countries had resumed. And you protested vigorously when an American newspaper reported that German tanks had appeared in Albania. So all was well. We were in Albania, you were spectators and our English allies took part only with their aircraft and their fleet.

Only. You know how hard we tried to keep their participation at that. We need only recall that when a British airplane crashed in Thessaloniki we requested of the British that they not be the ones to recover it. So that not even 10 English soldiers be seen there. So that we do not provide a pretext. You laugh?... You should.

But at this time, even though we had relations, even though Germany’s position created a sense of some calm, you started to assemble forces in Romania. At first they were intended to train Romanians. Then they were to protect the oil there. Then they were to protect that country’s borders. Then — then they were 400,000. At that time, the undersigned visited Bulgaria on a journalistic mission and passed along the route that your troops are now passing. On his return, he told our late prime minister: “The road to Sofia has been widened. The wooden bridges have been recently fortified with supports. The shavings from the timber are still there. It is clear that the Bulgarians have worked hastily to prepare the road for an army to pass upon it...”

After this, what was Greece to do? To request assistance? Not to request assistance? To show trust? Not to show trust? Could Greece remain unmoved when it saw the Germans on the Bulgarian border, when it counted them crossing the Danube, when it saw them entering Sofia and forging an alliance with the Bulgarians, when it heard the Bulgarians talk about the national goals that they wanted to achieve? Could Greece believe that the Germans were in Koula (on the Greek-Bulgarian border) in order to protect Romanian oil?

But even so, let us leave all these incidents and declarations and history aside and let us come to the present. It appears, according to all the world’s radio stations, that the Germans want to invade Greece. And we ask you: Why? If the operation against Greece were deemed necessary for the Axis from the start, then (Italian ambassador Count Emmanuele) Grazzi would not have appeared on his own (to Metaxas) four months ago at 3 o’clock in the morning. Italy and Germany together would have presented another ultimatum, with different contents, with different deadlines.

So, the operation against Greece was not deemed necessary for the Axis at the start. But is it now? Why? So that there may not be a new front against Germany in the Balkans? But that is nonsense.

Neither Greece, which is at war, nor England (it clearly says as much in the official statement of two days ago, on March 6, but common sense argues for this even more strongly), nor Serbia, nor Turkey have any reason to provoke the further spread of the war. The war as it is is enough for them. In which case, why? Is it so that the Italians can be rescued in Albania? But what kind of rescue will this be? Will the Italians not be seen by the whole world to have been defeated totally, finally and for all time the moment the first German soldier sets foot in Greece? Will the whole world not cry out that all 45 million of them attacked our small nation of 8 million and they now call on the help of another 85 million to save them?

And in the end, they may want to be rescued, but why should others come to their rescue in a way that is so demeaning? When we can help rescue them without making fools of them? Let the Italians leave Albania of their own accord... Let them tell everyone that they beat us, that they got tired of chasing us around, that they have had their fill of glory and are now leaving. We will help them.

But you may ask, Excellency, “All this is well and good, but what about the English?” However, Excellency, we did not bring the English to Greece, the Italians did. Can we now tell those whom the Italians brought to go? And let us say that we tell them to leave. Who do we address this to? To the living. But how do we ask for the removal of those who have died? Those who fell in our mountains, those who — wounded — landed their planes in Attica and left their last breath here, those who, though their own country was in flames, came and fought here and fell here and found their grave here?

Listen, Excellency, there are shameful deeds that are not committed in Greece. And that would be a most shameful deed. We can chase out neither the living nor the dead. We will not chase out anyone. We will stand with them, here, until there is a ray of sunshine and the storm is over.

And you? You — they always say — will try to invade Greece. And we? We are a naive nation still and we do not believe this. We do not believe that an army with a long history and tradition — which even its enemies do not deny — will want to soil itself with a horribly wretched act. We do not believe that a heavily armed State of 85 million people fighting to create “a new world order” will ask for an attack on a small Nation that is fighting for its freedom against an Empire of 45 million. Because, what will this army do, Excellency, if instead of infantry, artillery and divisions Greece sends to its borders 20,000 wounded — without legs, without arms, in their bloodied bandages — to meet it? Is there an army anywhere that could attack such border guards?

But no, this will not happen. If called upon, the army of Greece, whatever it is that remains free, will stand in Thrace they way it stood in Epirus. It will fight in Thrace as it did in Epirus. It will fight hard. It will die. And it will await the return from Berlin of the runner who came here five years ago and took with him the flame from Olympia, only to return with a torch to light a fire that threatens this land which may be small but is also great. This land that taught the world to live will now teach it how to die.